Turbulent waters in the South China Sea

Nationalistic protests in China are flaring up across the
country Click here, having been stoked by a series of stand-offs between Chinese
civilian activists and Japanese authorities over the disputed Diaoyu钓鱼岛/Senkaku island in the South China
Sea. They are fuelled by high-profile moves of right-wing Japanese politicians
to formally showcase Japan's claimed sovereignty, including planting Japanese
flags on rocks and “nationalization” by purchasing this island from purported
private Japanese “owners”.

Historically, this tiny island outcrop dates back to the
Ming dynasty. It became annexed by Japan towards the tail-end of the nineteenth
century.  According to both China and the
Taiwan governments, it reverted to Chinese sovereignty at the end of the Second
World War. However, in 1972 its administration was handed back by the U.S. to
Japan along with that of the Ryukyu Islands Click here. 

Sino-Japanese relations have not been very cordial at the
best of times. In recent years, they have been further soured by visits of various
Prime Ministers (such as Koizumi) and other senior Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni
Shrine, which honours several Class A Japanese war criminals along with other Japanese
war deads. To the Chinese people, Japan, unlike Germany, has never really
wanted to atone for its war crimes.

The flare-up of nationalism is exacerbated by a feeling of
the Chinese people that even after "centuries of humiliation" at the
hands of foreign occupiers, the country in this day and age is still failing to
stand up to perceived “aggressors” .  However,
this time around, rather than fanning nationalism as a means to bolster the
Party's rule as some academics have postulated (See,
for example, "China's New
Nationalism", Peter Hays Gries, University of California Press, 2005), the Chinese government is now
trying to restrain a rising tide of aggressive nationalism which threatens to
scuttle the nation's efforts to project an international image of peaceful
"rise" or "development".

In any case, the geopolitical dynamics in the South China
Sea have changed rapidly as China's military strength has been growing by leaps
and bounds, commensurate with the size of China's economy. An article in The
Economist (7 April, 2012)  "China’s
military rise -The dragon’s new teeth” provides “A rare look inside the world’s biggest
military expansion" Click here.

China’s expanded military capabilities have materialized not
only in response to the geopolitical risks over Taiwan but also to those over strategic
Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) in the South China Sea. These are critical
conduits for essential energy and other resources vital to China’s economic
survival. Such risks are increasingly being felt over the so-called “First and
Second Island Chains” Click here encircling China’s maritime periphery marked by powerful
American naval presence.

U.S. Pivot to Asia

The perceived threats of U.S. military containment are
accentuated by America’s recent "Pivot to Asia", following Secretary
Hilary Clinton’s declaration of America’s new “Pacific Century”. Click here

This has ushered in renewed and enhanced formal and informal
U.S. military ties and large-scale joint naval exercises with China's
neighbours, including Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines. In
particular, a US-Japan 37-day joint military drill off the coast of the Northern Marianas starting 21 August 2012 focussed
on simulations to re-take invaded islands. This was ostensibly aimed to counter
any Chinese offensive over the Diaoyu/Senkaku island, notwithstanding US-Japan denial.
While America officially pronounces neutrality over disputed territories in
the South China Sea, these military manoeuvres hardly create trust between
China and the United States.

Moreover, amongst this group of countries, a handful have
territorial disputes with the Middle Kingdom. They have now become emboldened
to proactively exert their rival sovereignty claims over such territories
as the Spratlys, the Paracels, and the Scarborough Shoal, historically all
claimed by China, resulting in several stand-offs with Chinese civilian vessels
in recent months.

The geopolitical reality is that virtually all of China’s
neighbours, including Japan, depend on China economically as their largest
trading partner. They are unlikely to wish to form an anti-China military bloc.
Nevertheless, they all welcome a free-ride on America's naval protection as a
strategic hedge against a rising China.

Meanwhile, China has been strengthening her naval defences in
the South China Sea. The refitting and commissioning of China’s first aircraft
carrier, the Varyag, an old Russian
model, was China’s first open demonstration of a clear intention to build a
blue-water navy. While China’s naval force still remains decades behind American
global naval assets, technology, readiness, outreach and manoeuvrability, military
strategists are becoming alarmed by China's advances in "A2/AD
(anti-access/area-denial)" capabilities, including mobile "aircraft-carrier
killer" missiles, as well as in “C5ISR” (Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Combat Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), not
to mention high capabilities in cyber-warfare and space technologies. These are
being deployed and continually developed to deter and delay potential adversary
military deployment in case of a war over the Taiwan Strait, as Taiwan remains China's
predominant core interest. Click here

Mounting military tensions  

China is becoming more and more alarmed at her neighbours’
increasing assertive rival territorial claims and at what seems to be a
tightening of military encirclement around China’s periphery.  It is no surprise that on 24 July 2012 China moved quickly to
upgrade a county-level administrative unit to a new prefecture given the name
of Sansha ( 三沙, short for the three groups of islands in the south,
east and west in the South China Sea).
This is set up to “administer” several island groups and undersea atolls in the
area, including the Spratly, the Paracel Islands and
the Macclesfield Bank, right
in the heart of the disputed waters. The new prefecture-level administrative
unit, equipped with a new garrison, is
located on Yongxing 永兴岛(Woody) Island, the
largest of the Paracel and Spratly islands with an area of about 5 square miles,
on which some 600 Chinese civilians currently live.

To counter China’s rising military capabilities, it is
reported that the U.S. military is planning a major expansion of missile defences
in Asia, to be located in regional allies such as Japan, South Korea and
Australia. At the centre of these defences is a powerful radar, the X-Band, to
provide an early-warning arc against potential hostile missile strikes from
North Korea or China. Click here At around the same time, the Communist Party-run
Global Times reported that China was developing a multiple-warhead ballistic
missile that could potentially overcome US anti-missile defences.

While China's rising military strength is perceived as a
threat by America and China's neighbours, many Chinese people, particularly
the young generation and some in the Chinese military, remain dissatisfied with
a perceived weakness in response to challenges to China’s sovereignty. Hence
the rising tide of Chinese nationalistic anti-Japan protests over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu island stand-off. These opposing forces, coupled with the
discovery of rich potential gas reserves in these waters, are driving negative
feed-back loops characteristic of a classical “security dilemma” between the
various players, including America. This feeds at best into a mistrustful Cold
War mentality and at worst runs the risk of misunderstanding, miscalculation,
and misadventure, which do not augur well for regional stability or world
peace. 

Regional dynamics of China’s Rise

According to Professor Zhang Yuling and Associate Research
Fellow Tang Shiping, both of the Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, in their joint paper "China’s Regional Strategy" in “Power Shift, China’s and
Asia’s New Dynamics”, David Shambaugh (ed.), University of California
Press, 2005, there
are four core concepts underpinning China’s current grand strategy for the
nation. The first dates back to Dr.Sun Yat –sen, modern China’s founding
father. It suggests that China, by virtue of its size, population, civilization,
history and economy, rightly belongs to the “great power club”. Second, China
needs a stable and peaceful international environment to continue its
development. Third, following the advice of Deng Xiaoping, until China has
become fully developed and possesses the necessary capacities, the country
should refrain from seeking leadership. This is his famous “buyao dangtou不要当头” strategy. Fourth, as China’s
ongoing economic welfare and national security depend on integration with the
world order, it would be in China’s interest to behave as a “responsive great
power” (fuzeren de daguo负责任的大国).

This grand strategy implies avoiding confrontation with the
United States as the world’s sole superpower, maintaining amicable relations
with neighbours, embracing multilateralism, and upholding a traditional
definition of national sovereignty that opposes foreign intervention unless expressly
authorized by the United Nations. In order words, as a matter of priority, democracy
between nations (not so much within nations) should be upheld.

Following this strategy, China has become the centre of the
region’s supply and production chain, making her economic growth a dynamic
opportunity for the region rather than a threat. China became the first nation
outside the ASEAN to sign in 2003 the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia. She has now established the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, the
world’s biggest by population size and has deepened her interest and
participation in the security confidence-building-measures (CBMs) at the ASEAN
Regional Forum.

However, for those with a “realist” zero-sum mindset, any
gain in China’s regional engagement can be interpreted as diluting America’s
regional dominance and therefore “may not be good for America”, as in the case of Robert
Sutter, Visiting Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown
University in “Power Shift" (ibid.) .

Nevertheless, China’s rise has been
characterized by the exercise of “normative” and “remunerative” rather than
“coercive” power, according
to Amitai Etzioni’s power classifications in “A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations”, revised ed., New
York: The Free Press, 1975.

This trajectory of “peaceful rise” conforms with an earlier
“new security concept” articulated by
China’s former Foreign Minister Qian Quichen, which consists of reassurance
based on cooperative security, dialogue, and mutual economic benefit.

China has therefore been operating within, and stands to
benefit from, a stable international order
largely underwritten by the United States. While a rising China can no longer unreservedly
accept America’s dominance, it would not be in China’s best interest to
dislodge the United States from the Asian region, let alone China’s current lack
of comprehensive capacity to do so. Seen in this light, “China’s rise in Asia
need not be at America’s expense”, according to David Lampton, George and Sadie Hyman Professor and Director of China
Studies at the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International
Studies, in “Power Shift" (ibid.)

Moreover, in the coming decades of the 21^st
century, while the United States’ leadership is expected to remain, its
capacity to lead is likely to continue declining, according to the Report “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed
World”, National
Intelligence Council, Washington D.C, 21 November, 2008.

In an increasingly inter-connected and
inter-dependent world, there has emerged a host of complex challenges with
global dimensions, such as terrorism, piracy, nuclear proliferation and climate
change. As a diminished superpower, America needs to work more closely with a
host of state and non-state actors as well as allies and non-allies alike,
including a rising China, in maintaining global and regional order and
stability.

On the part of America, therefore, it would be undesirable
and unrealistic to arrest the historical trend of China’s rise. Even King Canute
could not command the tide.   

Fractured regional peace and stability

For decades Asia has enjoyed relative peace and stability in
an Asian Order guaranteed by the United States as the world’s unrivalled
military and economic superpower .Within this order, Asian nations have
benefitted from rising trade, investment, technology and other flows within and
outside the region. China, in particular, has become the centre of a regional
production and supply chain and as the largest trading partner and a key driver
of economic growth for China’s neighbours. Through China’s active and
non-assertive participation in the ASEAN community and other regional forums, China has built
up a relatively cordial relationship with nations in the region. Territorial
disputes rose from time to time but have never threatened to undermine the
regional security system. This is because the system’s stability is supported
by China and America, the region’s two world-power adversaries, who have
embraced an inter-connected and inter-dependent relationship, which was coined
“chimerica” by historian Niall
Ferguson in 2006. 

Now the regional security system appears to crack. This is due
to a looming split in the symbiotic relationship between the United States and
China. America is feeling the pain of outsourcing jobs to China. It has become
alarmed by excessive consumption of China’s goods through rising levels of
national debt financed by China’s largesse of buying up a vast quantity of U.S.
treasuries. On her part, after the lessons of the global financial crisis, China
has become aware of the risks of over-reliance on exports and the folly of
tying up so much of her hard-earned savings in a “U.S Dollar Trap.” Click here
Moreover, a combination of China’s rapidly growing economic and regional
influence, coupled with the country’s problematic political image and increasing
military capabilities, adds up to a pervasive sense of “China threat”. This
has resulted in unease, suspicion, and mistrust, if not paranoia. A “Great Sino-American Divorce” is now looming
on the horizon, according to Mark Leonard, Reuters Columnist and Co-Founder and Director of the
European Council on Foreign Relations. Click here. The growing regional
instability calls for a re-think for a more sustainable Asian Order to take
account of changed geopolitical realities.

Tentative Models  for a future Asian
Order

David Shambaugh categorized the evolution of a new Asian
Order under different hypothetical scenarios in “The Rise of China and Asia’s New Dynamics”, his Introduction to “Power Shift" (ibid.) –

(a) an hegemonic system dominated by a rising China, either
coercive (badao霸道)
or benigh (wangdao 王道) in nature, predicated
on American withdrawal from the region;

(b) a zero-sum power rivalry between the United States and
China;

(c) a regional system of bilateral U.S military allies
centred on the United States as the hub, including Japan, South Korea, the
Philippines, Thailand and Australia;

(d) a delicate balance between regional powers in the kind
of stability which lasted for  half a
century in the Concert of Europe in the wake of the Congress of Vienna of 1815;

(e) a regional power condominium between the United States
and China, accommodating China’s core regional interests;

(f) a normative community supported by institutionalization
of the “ASEAN Way” based on a consultative and consensual process upholding
individual sovereignty and statehood;

(g) a complex network of inter-dependent economic,
technological, cultural, educational, ideational and other non-state actors
linking Asia’s subregions of Northeast, Southeast, South and Central Asia
together; and

(h) a mixture of the above.

Whatever model or mixture of models may emerge in the long run,
there is no doubt how a rising China is engaged in the coming decades by the
world at large and by the region in particular would go a long way in shaping
what China may look like as a superpower. A deciding factor is the relationship
between the United States as the existing superpower and China as its perceived
rising challenger.

Prescriptions for a new Asian Order

In an article “The China Choice: A Bold Vision
for U.S.-China Relations” in The Diplomat, an international
current-affairs online magazine for the Asia-Pacific region, Hugh White, professor of strategic studies at Australian
National University and a visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute, advanced a
new power-sharing approach to avoid a possible
“deadly strategic rivalry”.  Taking
realistic account of China’s rise as a regional power, White proposes a kind of
“Concert of Asia” where America would share power and partner with China as an
equal in maintaining Asia’s regional stability, accommodating or balancing
China’s core regional interests, along with those of India and Japan. The
article draws on his thought-provoking book “The China Choice”.

Download The China Choice A Bold Vision for U.S.-China Relations _ The Diplomat

White’s “Concert of Asia” idea is heavily criticized as
unworkable by Rory Medcalf, director of the international security program at
the Lowy Institute, pointing to the impracticability of defining spheres of
influence between the core powers of this Concert and how medium-size states
like Australia could fit from the outside.

Download Why a U.S.-China ‘Grand Bargain’ in Asia Would Fail _ The Diplomat

Nevertheless, White’s balancing approach in treating a
rising China as an equal regional power may well serve to build a more
sustainable US-China relationship. The challenge is how this can be achieved
without compromising the interests of America’s key regional allies. 

China’s regional power, moreover, cannot be separted from the
country’s growing influence globally. Europe and China are increasingly
integrated economically as Europe has become China’s largest trading partner,
ahead of the United States. China’s footprint is almost ubiquitous in Africa
and is also spreading in Latin America, right in the backyard of the United
States. So balancing against China’s power cannot be confined to only the Asian
theatre.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, a doyen in American foreign policy and National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981, has
recently advanced a global U.S. grand strategy Click here. It has two main strands.

The first is that he sees Europe as an
inseparable part of a Western whole which underpins US leadership. He
postulates that the US should act as “promoter and guarantor” of a renewed “Larger West” by drawing Russia and Turkey
into the European Union through
gradual democratization and eventual conformity with Western norms. (Paving
the way for Russia to join the WTO would be part of this trajectory.) At
the same time, instead downplaying Europe, he emphasizes the importance of
deepening the unification of the European Union through fostering close
cooperation among the key players of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

The second, and inter-related, strand is the
“Complex East”,
where the U.S. best interest would be served by acting as “regional balancer”,
“replicating the role played by the United Kingdom in intra European politics
during the nineteenth and early twentieth century.”

Seemingly echoing America’s “Pivot to Asia”,
he suggests that the United States “should help Asian states avoid a struggle
for regional domination by mediating conflicts and offsetting power imbalances
among potential rivals”.

However, contrary to the popular rhetoric of
American military power projection in the Asia-Pacific, he points out that “the
United States must recognize that stability in Asia can no longer be imposed by
a non-Asian power, least of all by the direct application of U.S. military
power. Indeed, U.S. efforts to buttress Asian stability could prove
self-defeating, propelling Washington into a costly repeat of its recent wars,
potentially even resulting in a replay of the tragic events of Europe in the
twentieth century. If the United States fashioned an anti-Chinese alliance with
India (or, less likely, with Vietnam) or promoted an anti-Chinese
militarization in Japan, it could generate dangerous mutual resentment”. He
recognizes that “in the twenty-first century, geopolitical equilibrium on the
Asian mainland cannot depend on external military alliances with non-Asian
powers”.

Instead, Brzezinski advocates that America
“should respect China's special historic and geopolitical role in maintaining
stability on the Far Eastern mainland. Engaging with China in a dialogue
regarding regional stability would not only help reduce the possibility of
U.S.-Chinese conflicts but also diminish the probability of miscalculation
between China and Japan, or China and India, and even at some point between
China and Russia over the resources and independent status of the Central Asian
states. Thus, the United States' balancing engagement in Asia is ultimately in
China's interest, as well.”

It is clear that Brzezinski’s Asia is a much
wider region which includes Central Asia connecting all the way to the “Larger
West”

A lynchpin of this realism is a “U.S.-Japanese-Chinese
cooperative triangle”to
be nurtured through progressive, but lasting reconciliation between China and
Japan, similar to that between France and German and between Germany and Poland
after World War II.  In this context, “the guiding principle of the United
States should be to uphold U.S. obligations to Japan and South Korea while not
allowing itself to be drawn into a war between Asian powers.”

“In that context, China should not view U.S.
support for Japan's security as a threat, nor should Japan view the pursuit of
a closer and more extensive U.S.-Chinese partnership as a danger to its own
interests. A deepening triangular relationship could also diminish Japanese
concerns over the yuan's eventually becoming the world's third reserve
currency, thereby further consolidating China's stake in the existing
international system and mitigating U.S. anxieties over China's future role”.

What is perhaps the most striking in
Brzezinski’s China engagement strategy is his recognition of and suggestions
for resolving the three sticking points in US-China relations with suggested timelines:

(a)  “First, the United States should
reassess its reconnaissance operations on the edges of Chinese
territorial waters, as
well as the periodic U.S. naval patrols within international waters that are
also part of the Chinese economic zone. They are as provocative to Beijing as
the reverse situation would be to Washington”.

(b) “Second, given that the continuing
modernization of China's military capabilities could eventually
give rise to legitimate U.S. security concerns, including over U.S. commitments
to Japan and South Korea, the United States and China should engage in regular
consultations regarding their long-term military planning and seek to craft
measures of reciprocal reassurance”.

(c)  “Third, the future status of
Taiwan could become the most contentious issue between the two
countries. Washington no longer recognizes Taiwan as a sovereign state and
acknowledges Beijing's view that China and Taiwan are part of a single nation.
But at the same time, the United States sells weapons to Taiwan. Thus, any
long-term U.S.-Chinese accommodation will have to address the fact that a
separate Taiwan, protected indefinitely by U.S. arms sales, will provoke
intensifying Chinese hostility. An eventual resolution along the lines of
former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's well-known formula for Hong Kong of
"one country, two systems," but redefined as "one country,
several systems," may provide the basis for Taipei's eventual
re-association with China, while still allowing Taiwan and China to maintain
distinctive political, social, and military arrangements (in particular,
excluding the deployment of People's Liberation Army troops on the island).
Regardless of the exact formula, given China's growing power and the greatly
expanding social links between Taiwan and the mainland, it is doubtful that
Taiwan can indefinitely avoid a more formal connection with China”.

Brzezinski suggests that the first of these
sticking points be resolved in the near future, the second over the course of
the next several years, and the third probably within a decade or so.

Brzezinski ’s whole rationale
is summarized in his opening remarks – “The United States' central challenge
over the next several decades is to revitalize itself, while promoting a larger
West and buttressing a complex balance in the East that can accommodate China's
rising global status. A successful U.S. effort to enlarge the West, making it
the world's most stable and democratic zone, would seek to combine power with
principle. A cooperative larger West — extending from North America and Europe
through Eurasia (by eventually embracing Russia and Turkey), all the way to
Japan and South Korea — would enhance the appeal of the West's core principles
for other cultures, thus encouraging the gradual emergence of a universal
democratic political culture.”

Drawing a distinction from the historical
geopolitics governing the separate fates of the Eastern and Western Roman Empires,
Brzezinski opines that in a globalized and inter-connected world, “the West and
the East cannot keep aloof from each other: their relationship can only be
either reciprocally cooperative or mutually damaging”.

Conclusion

China’s re-emergence as a world
power signifies a turning of the tide in the flow of history. A classic drama
of transition with the status quo superpower, the United States, is playing out.
The fracturing of the Asian Order in which both powers are key players is a
clear manifestation. Containing or
confronting this transition militarily is fraught with uncontrollable risks – a “security dilemma” that has all the tendency of escalating into a regional if
not global war. Managing and accommodating it without sacrificing American interests
takes a great deal of insight and strategic thinking in the broadest context.

The increasing instability of
the Asian region calls for fresh thinking and maturity beyond military
manoeuvres. It is instructive that amidst China’s unease with large-scale U.S. joint
military exercises in the South China Sea, PLA deputy chief of general
staff Cai Yingting paid a three-day visit (25-27 August 2012) to Washington and
the Pentagon. The purpose is to reaffirm the development of a
"win-win" relationship based on "respect, fairness and
tolerance" between the US and China, paving the way for a subsequent visit
of US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta to China
the following month.

What is clear is that events
and developments in the Asian theatre are unlikely to follow any pre-scripted
model. Yet understanding the underlying dynamics may go a long way into better managing
the critical U.S.-China relationship, the most important bilateral relationship
in the 21^st century.

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