The Communist Party has reiterated
that China will chart its own path of development and will not copy the Western
model of rival multi-party politics. Political reform, however, is
getting more pressing as mounting social discontent is posing an existential
threat to the Party. Given China’s entrenched vested interests, most pundits
have grave doubts whether Xi Jinping, albeit more powerful than his
predecessor, would be able to deliver during his presidency.

On the other hand, there are some who harbour patriotic
hopes of grandeur. For example, Yau Lop Poon, chief editor of Yazhou Zuoukan, an
Asian weekly, opines (1) that drawing from reform experiences of Myanmar,
Singapore, and South African, China should embark on a “creative
transformation”, through a peaceful and systemic process, to build its unique
political system of checks and balance that manages to resist the temptations
of elite capitalism. The vision is to develop a Chinese model that delivers
administrative efficiency, clean government, social justice and sustained, high
economic growth. Such a model, if realized, would be the pride of the Chinese
people and a marvel to the rest of the world.

High hopes, however, often fail to accord with reality. At
any rate, a tall tower needs to be built from the ground, as the Chinese saying
goes.

So it is refreshing, and extremely timely, that Professor Yu
Jianrong of the Chinese Academy of Social Science circulated a succinct,
down-to-earth, 10-year outline for China’s social and political development. First
promulgated in April this year, it went viral on Sina Weibo amongst his 1.5
million followers on the popular micro-blogging site (2).

Professor
Yu’s roadmap is divided into two distinct phases. Phase One, from 2012.10 –
2015.12, contains four categories.

First,
people’s livelihood policies. Rural land rights are to be legally recognised. Welfare
provisions for lower-income groups are to be expanded. The “hukou” (household
registration) system which marginalizes migrant workers is to be reformed.

Second,
judicial checks and balance and judiciary authority. The staff, finance, and
properties of primary and intermediate courts are to be separated from county and municipal
governments and to be managed at the provincial level. A system
of life appointment of judges with high salaries is to be introduced, subject
to mandatory mobility and strict accountability for miscarriage of justice. A
few retrograde and obsolete state organs are to be abolished, such as “political-legal
committees” below the provincial level (as they often tend to take the law into
their own hands), the State Bureau for Letters
and Calls for petitions to Beijing (outstanding grievance cases to be resolved through
judicial processes), and the labour re-education system (thereby safeguarding
citizens’ personal rights).

Third,
press freedom and freedom of expression. This extends to transparency of
administrative information, declaration by officials of their private assets,
and prohibition of punishment for expression.

Four,
social development and civil society. This covers the improvement of
neighbourhood management, promotion of charitable organizations, and protection
of religious organisations.

Phase
Two, from 2016.01 – 2022.09, contains two categories.

First, reform of county-level government. This proposes the “de
administrativization”  and
professionalization of county-level deputies elected to the National People’s
Congress; scrapping the system of appointing county-level officials from the
outside; introducing “differential-quota” competitive elections for the top county
leader;  and turning county and
township levels of government into subordinate outposts of higher authorities.

Second,
open society. This comprises the formulation of laws for press freedom
and laws for political parties. The management of the media and political
organizations is to be liberalized.

Professor
Yu’s reform agenda tallies with a much more voluminous, wide-ranging and
officially recognized reform blueprint – a 468-page World Bank report jointly
undertaken with the Development Research Centre of the State Council. This is
similarly well-timed, coming out on 27 February, and is entitled “China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious,
and Creative High-Income Society."(3)

In line with
the latest Five Year Plan, the World Bank report focuses on efficiency,
equity, and sustainability. Its prescriptions include –

(a) re-defining sources of revenue and scope
of responsibilities between the central and local governments. This is designed
to minimize local government land grabs as their main source of revenue;

(b) reform of state-owned enterprises and
promotion of the private sector;

(c) guaranteeing a decent standard of living
for the people by providing full access to public services including healthcare,
education and housing by 2020;

(d) unblocking the "hukou"  system to enhance social mobility;

(e) using the rising middle class as a
catalyst for improved governance, standards of services, and empowerment of
civil society;

(f) liberalizing the financial system to
achieve higher total factor productivity;

(g) pushing ahead with the internationalization
and eventual capital-account convertibility of the RMB (the Chinese yuan) with
a view to its becoming an international reserve currency;

(h) delivering a comprehensive economic,
social and environmental agenda to achieve a green economy by 2030 (e.g. capitalizing
on a voluntary "cap-and-trade" scheme and introducing green standards
in government procurement); and

(i) playing a more proactive role as a
responsible stakeholder in helping to shape the global order, commensurate with
China’s growing size and influence.

At the 18^th Party Congress, the
two primary targets for the next decade are fighting corruption and achieving a
middle-class society by nearly doubling income per capita from $5,530 in 2011 to
$10,000 by 2020.

Provided China continues to grow at an
average annual rate of just 7%, which doesn’t seem impossible, the objective of
achieving per capita income of $10,000 by 2020 is by no means unrealistic. The
above reform blueprints are likely to enhance accountability, transparency and the
rule of law, which should help the new Politburo Standing Committee graft-buster
Wang Qishan, who is known for his toughness, to turn the table on corruption.

Contrary to popular thinking, Xi's team of six in a more compact Politburo Standing Committee, the country's nerve centre, could well be "China's Dream Team", according to Stephen Roach, Chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia and senior fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute of
Global Affairs. Click here

Xi is by no means a "conservative" in a traditional sense and Li Keqiang, now elevated to No.2 unlike previous adminstrations, is an avid reformer. Both hold doctorates in law and economics respectively. Virtually all the others hold degrees in the humanities rather then engineering. The other most senior leaders, Yu Zhengsheng, Zhang Dejiang and Zhang Gaolic come from
senior roles in three of China’s most powerful and dynamic urban centers
– Shanghai, Chongqing, and Tianjin. They bring together a vast pool of political and administrative leadership which is extremely relevant in the coming decades as China is growing a more balanced, consumer-oriented economy. China's urbanization exceeded 50% in January 2012.  According to the Brookings Institution, the consuming middle-class will grow from 12% to 70% of China's population by 2030. Click here